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Historic Preservation Law and Advocacy
PAUL SPENCER BYARD*
There is less trumpet sounding than I might have expected
in the presentations today. This is unusual because the implica-
tions of Penn Central' for advocacy are so great that the public
perception will shift from seeing preservation as a matter of
pleasure to seeing it as a public necessity.
The question of advocacy has two prongs: first, the advocacy
that made the decision possible and, second, the advocacy that
the Penn Central case will reinforce. Penn Central is one point
in the evolution from enthusiasm to advocacy of the underlying
issues in this field. It is a vindication of the almost unreadable
but nevertheless very bold New York City Landmarks Preserva-
tion Law.' When this law was enacted in 1965, there was nothing
like it in the United States. This legislation was a product of
civil advocacy prompted in large part by the Municipal Arts So-
ciety.3 The law was so far ahead of its time that it was hard for
its own Commission4 to administer it. One of its early adminis-
trators, Frank Gilbert, was extremely effective in its
enforcement.
Penn Central is a vindication, also, of two difficult adminis-
trative choices; first, whether to designate the building as an his-
toric landmark, and second, whether to deny the owners a certif-
icate of appropriateness and to face the painful consequences. I
do not mean to suggest that the distinguished commissioners
weighed anything but the merits in their determination to desig-
nate Grand Central Station. On the other hand, their choice to
designate was, from the point of advocacy, a choice of the
ground on which to fight for the law and for the principles that
it included. Over the years there has been a significant differ-
ence of opinion as to whether this was a good ground to choose.
The special facts of the case really limit the applicability of the
decision and probably make it unavailable to parcels which lack
its particular attributes.
A more subtle piece of advocacy involves the determination
1
PACE LAW REVIEW
of what buildings a commission will subject to control. A com-
mission must know the public interest in these buildings; a local
advocacy group like the Municipal Arts Society can help by tak-
ing a position as to what buildings are worthy of designation.
Such advocacy is needed in designating a landmark like Grand
Central.
Penn Central is an example of a particular advocacy that is
outstanding. It is impossible to overstate the merits of the job of
argument that was done by the New York City Corporation
Counsel's office. The Corporation Counsel's office has always
been, in the best of times, one of the nation's great law firms.
Even in the worst of times, the City was able to find for its Cor-
poration Counsel's office people like Nina Gershon and Leonard
Kerner, who could carry the major burden for the argument of
this case.
The City had a battery of friends of the court. This battery
at the beginning was very small consisting only of the Municipal
Arts Society, which participated in the Supreme Court proceed-
ing5 before Justice Saypol. Justice Saypol thought that Grand
Central was a faded and rather dirty beauty. Since he did not
like it, he thought the regulation was invalid. Unfortunately, our
efforts at advocacy in that particular proceeding did not make a
material difference to the outcome.
In the Appellate Division,6 an effort again was organized by
the Municipal Arts Society. The result was a special committee
to save Grand Central which brought together local organiza-
tions. With the helpful participation of the National Trust for
Historic Preservation, we, as amici curiae, made a significant
contribution in this proceeding. It was a great moment, as an
amicus, to be quoted in the opinion. The Municipal Arts Society
was quoted in the form of a single word. My brother counsels
and I had argued over whether to use "eviscerate," or "emascu-
late," or a synonym. We used "eviscerate" and it is in the opin-
ion.7 We turned up one more time in the Court of Appeals.
What happened there was beyond the anticipation of any of the
advocates.
On the national level, the Municipal Arts Society, as one of
several amici before the United States Supreme Court, contin-
ued this advocacy, working closely with the National Trust. This




David Bonderman devised the theory that Justice Breitel should
be dealt with in a footnote. The Supreme Court found the case
so difficult that they agreed with that theory.9 The Municipal
Arts Society, other local groups, and the City of New York can
take pride in their roles in the Penn Central case.
The Penn Central case will not permit a different approach
of advocacy because of what the Supreme Court had done for
preservation law. The decision represents a substantial endorse-
ment of preservationist activity. For years, preservation advo-
cates had to rely upon dictum from Mr. Justice Douglas in
Berman v. Parker,10 even if irrelevant to the case being litigated.
Now we have a determination on point that permits action. It is
a powerful incentive to go further in similar cases. Local regulat-
ing bodies will be less timid when they want to regulate. They
have a mandate to regulate in this kind of case. We look forward
to some regulation from even reluctant governments who now
recognize that to lack a historic preservation ordinance is to be
substantially behind the times.
There are some things that Penn Central did not do. It did
not contribute much to the refinement of the decision-making
process. The process still remains a matter of totaling the pluses
and minuses and coming out with a feeling that it does not hurt
too much to impose regulation in a particular case. Nor does the
decision deal with the law of constraints on public action. Penn
Central is an approval of a local law which regulates private ac-
tion. It does not enter into the body of law that environmental-
ists have clearly seen as critical, namely, public actions that are
inconsistent with preservation. That issue could have been
raised in Penn Central because of the enormous public partici-
pation in the continued operation of the railroad.
The public interest that was evident in the Penn Central
case has also led to other developments in the area of historic
preservation advocacy. About a year and a half ago, an ex-
traordinary meeting sponsored by the Kaplan Foundation
brought together many of the participants in this conference to
discuss whether, in the process of advocating these issues, there
was something missing. At that time, there were local laws, pub-
lic support for those laws, public programs, and the National
Trust as the central agency of some forms of public action with




however, a feeling that what was missing was an organization
whose sole interest would be the evolution of the law of preser-
vation. The object of that organization would be to advance un-
derstanding of the underlying issues in the preservation cases, to
support the activities of local groups, and to be a plaintiff with
respect to critical issues, particularly in areas where public ac-
tion is an issue. Public interest law firms provided the model for
this idea.
That meeting was the genesis of the National Center for
Preservation Law, the first public interest law firm devoted to
issues of law in the built environment. A study was funded by
the Kaplan Foundation and the National Endowment for the
Arts. A Board of Directors was recruited, which included
Whitney North Seymour, Senior, joined by Harry Lord, Lee Ad-
ler, Fred Williams, Ken Barwick, and the motivating forces,
Tersh Boasberg and me. Because of successful fund raising, the
Center is moving out of the study phase and into a three-year
trial period of substantial participation in controversies around
the country. We are working to make a base of actual achieve-
ment and to become like the National Resources Defense Coun-
cil, the Environmental Defense Fund, and similar institutions,
but in the historic preservation part of the environmental law
field.
This is a very exciting process. The Center is one of many
noncompetitive vehicles for advocacy in the environmental field.
Each makes a contribution. Of particular interest to me as a
practicing architect and a practicing lawyer will be the degree to
which the Center will be able to penetrate issues of mere aes-
thetics and arrive at the underlying questions of public health.
Penn Central convinces us that we are in the right area; it is
a blessing for this whole general undertaking, and we will now




5. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
6. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40C, § 3 (West 1979).
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